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ALLOWING THE DRUNK TO DRIVE:
SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT PAY?
Huhn v. Dixie Insurance Co.'
Due to legislative waiver and judicial decision, the traditional govern-
mental immunities have been receding at an ever increasing rate. One of the
untouched areas of immunity has been the protection afforded police de-
partments for injuries suffered by those with whom the police have had no
contact. However, given the mushrooming concern over the drunk driver, it
was only a matter of time before this immunity was questioned.
In the last two years, courts in various jurisdictions have been faced
with whether an action could be maintained for physical injuries based upon
a police officer's negligent failure to detain and arrest an intoxicated driver.
In the typical situation, a police officer had stopped a driver and then allowed
him to continue. Usually the officer pulled the driver over for suspicion of
intoxicated driving or some other moving violation. Shortly after being re-
leased by the officer, the driver had struck another vehicle and injured or
killed its passengers. Upon subsequent testing, it is discovered that the sus-
picious driver was legally intoxicated when the officer stopped him. The
injured parties or their survivors have then sued the governmental body that
employed the officer for that officer's negligence.
Not surprisingly, the courts have come to different conclusions on dif-
ferent grounds. Courts have, however, been focusing on two issues. The first
is the negligence element of duty. The courts have been asking whether the
police officer has a duty to use reasonable care with respect to the plaintiffs.
The second issue, often dispositive of the suit, is whether the individual state's
concept of sovereign immunity allows such a suit. Most recently, the Florida
Supreme Court, confronted with inconsistent district courts of appeal deci-
sions, had to address this most difficult issue.
The purpose of this Note is to analyze the different approaches of the
courts and the way in which the Florida Supreme Court decided this issue.
This Note will also explore the viability of this new cause of action in Missouri
courts.
1. 453 So. 2d 70 (Fla. Ct. Dist. App. 1984).
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The absence of the negligence element of duty was addressed by the
California Court of Appeal in Harris ex rel. Masuda v. Smith.2 The Cali-
fornia court recognized that before the question of sovereign immunity even
arises, a duty to the plaintiff must be found.' Only when there is a duty
upon which the governmental subdivision could be held liable is the concept
of sovereign immunity relevant. Therefore, the court proceeded to deal with
that question first.
The court first characterized the alleged negligence of the police officer
as nonfeasance-the failure to prevent the intoxicated operator from driving. 4
The court then reaffirmed the general principle that a person has no duty
to take affirmative action to aid another.5 If, however, a person does come
to the aid of another, the court stated that that person could be held liable
if he placed the other in peril, increased his risk of harm, or promised to
act and had not done so after the other had relied on the promise. 6 The
court thus announced that the real question was whether the officer had
acted affirmatively to increase the risk of harm.7 Reviewing the evidence, the
court found that the officer had not done so.8
However, the court never reconciled how it could find the necessary
affirmative act after it had defined the officer's conduct as nonfeasance. The
court also sidestepped the characterization problem inherent in such a dis-
tinction. The court could just as easily have defined the officer's actions as
misfeasance-the negligent releasing of an intoxicated driver.
The court further stated that a duty to the plaintiff did not arise merely
because the plaintiff was a reasonably foreseeable victim.9 Although the court
2. 157 Cal. App. 3d 100, 203 Cal. Rptr. 541 (1984). A police officer had
stopped a driver for speeding. Upon detecting alcohol on the driver's breath and
being told by him that he had been drinking, the officer had the driver perform three
field sobriety tests. The tests were the finger count, the standing balance, and either
the finger-to-nose coordination test or another standing balance test. The driver passed
all three tests. The officer also testified that the driver's speech and eyes were clear
and normal, that the driver had no difficulty exiting or entering his car, and that he
had no difficulty presenting his driver's license. The officer, believing he lacked
probable cause to arrest, allowed the driver to continue. Nine minutes later the driver
had an accident with the plaintiff. The driver died in the collision and it was sub-
sequently discovered that his blood alcohol level was .17. Id. at 102-03, 203 Cal. Rptr.
at 542.
The defendant in this suit was an attorney who had taken over the case and
subsequently failed to add a cause of action against the state and county for plaintiff's
injuries. When the statute of limitations ran, the plaintiff sued her attorney. Thus,
the legal malpractice claim depended upon a finding of actionable negligence on the
part of the state and county. Id. at 103, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 542.
3. Id. at 104, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 543.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 105, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 543.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 107, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 545.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 105, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 544.
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admitted that foreseeability was one factor in deciding whether a duty is
present, 0 the court sua sponte listed several other factors which California
courts consider in deciding if a duty is present." After discussing some of
those factors' 2 and an "all fours" case, 3 the court concluded that the police
officer owed no duty to the plaintiff in this situation. 
4
However, when faced with a similar situation, the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts in Irwin v. Town of Ware5 found that a duty to the plaintiff
10. Id. at 107, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 545.
11. Id. at 107-08, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 545. The court cited Thompson v. County
of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d 741, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70, 614 P.2d 728 (1980), for the list of
factors. That court stated:
[I]n considering the existence of a 'duty' in a given case several factors
require consideration including 'the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff,
the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the
connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the
moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing
future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences
to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability
for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the
risk involved .... "When public agenices are involved, additional elements
include the extent of [the agency's] powers, the role imposed upon it by law
and the limitations imposed upon it by budget; ... "
Id. at 750, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 74-75, 614 P.2d at 732-33 (citations omitted).
12. Harris, 157 Cal. App. 3d at 108, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 545-46. The court
stated that it believed no grave moral blame could be attached to the officer's conduct
and that it could find only a tenuous connection between the officer's conduct and
the plaintiff's injuries. It also asserted that the burden of performing an undetermined
number of sobriety tests outweighed the benefit of prevention of future harm.
Perhaps most important, the court recognized that the officer had required
the driver to pass three field sobriety tests and that the officer had testified that the
driver had appeared sober and coherent. The court further implied that there was no
serious suggestion of deficiency in the officer's conduct. It would seem that the court
was saying that the officer was reasonable as a matter of law.
13. Id. at 108-09, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 546. In Jackson v. Clements, 146 Cal.
App. 3d 983, 194 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1983), police officers investigated a party involving
minors who were imbibing intoxicating beverages. Based on their investigation, the
officers allegedly knew that the minors had drunk enough alcohol to become intox-
icated and that the minors intended to drive away. The alleged negligence was that
the officers did not halt the drinking nor did they prevent the minors from later
driving. Id. at 985-86, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 553.
The Harris court, stating that Jackson was on all fours, seems to ignore the
fact that the minors in Jackson had yet to drive at the time of the police officer's
investigation. The possible negligence of the police officer in Jackson involved the
failure to stop the minors from drinking and to prevent the possible future crime of
driving while intoxicated. In Harris, the negligence involved the failure to stop a
crime from continuing.
14. Harris, 157 Cal. App. 3d at 109, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 546.
15. 392 Mass. 745, 467 N.E.2d 1292 (1984). A police officer stopped a motorist
for speeding upon leaving a bar. After two police officers talked to the driver, he
was released without having undergone any field sobriety tests. Approximately ten
minutes later the driver was involved in an accident in which he and two others were
3
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did exist.' 6 The town had argued that no duty was owed to the plaintiff
under the public duty doctrine.' 7 The public duty doctrine states that duties
of public officers are normally owed to the general public only and thus a
breach of that duty cannot support a private cause of action.'8 However, the
court in Irwin ruled that the doctrine applied only to public inspections. 9
The court then stated that a duty could be found in these situations if
there was a special relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant. 21
The court stated that a prime consideration in finding such a special rela-
tionship was whether a defendant could reasonably foresee that he would be
expected to take action to protect the plaintiff and could anticipate harm to
the plaintiff if he failed to do so. 2' Further, such foreseeability could be
based on statutorily imposed duties.
22
The court next discussed its holdings in Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc. ,23
a case where an intoxicated patron was served liquor, and Michnik-Zilberman
v. Gordon's Liquor, Inc. ,24 a case where packaged liquor was sold to a minor.
The court found in those cases that the proprietors could be held liable to
killed and two other persons were severely injured. Id. at 763-64, 467 N.E.2d at 1304-
05.
Evidence had been introduced at trial that showed the officers had never illu-
minated the intoxicated driver's face or eyes. Id. at 763, 467 N.E.2d at 1304. A
witness also testified that she observed the stop for five minutes and saw the driver
swaying and holding on to a car door to steady himself; that there were no field
sobriety tests conducted; and that the driver walked back to his car "unsteadily."
Id., 467 N.E.2d at 1304-05. Additionally, one of the officers, upon hearing that
the driver had been in an accident, slammed his fist against a desk and proclaimed
"I told you we should have kept him." Id. at 764, 467 N.E.2d at 1035.
16. Id. at 762, 467 N.E.2d at 1303-04.
17. The public duty doctrine had been adopted in Dinsky v. Town of Fra-
mingham, 386 Mass. 801, 438 N.E.2d 51 (1982), a public inspection case.
18. Irwin, 392 Mass. at 754-55, 467 N.E.2d at 1299.
19. Id. at 755, 467 N.E.2d at 1300. The Florida Supreme Court recognized
in Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979),
that the public duty doctrine, which had been adopted in Modlin v. City of Miami
Beach, 201 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1967), was actually a part of common law sovereign
immunity. As such, the court concluded that such a doctrine had been overruled by
the Florida sovereign immunity statute. Commercial Carrier, 371 So. 2d at 1015.
Obviously, the Massachusetts court did not agree with that conclusion.
It is interesting to note that within Dinsky, quoted with approval, is a passage
from a case which specifically lists the police department as one of the governmental
functions falling under the public duty doctrine. Dinsky, 386 Mass. at 807, 438 N.E.2d
at 54 (quoting Tuffley v. Syracuse, 82 A.D. 2d 110, 114, 442 N.Y.S.2d 326, 329
(1981)).
20. Irwin, 392 Mass. at 756, 467 N.E.2d at 1300.
21. Id., 467 N.E.2d at 1300.
22. Id., 467 N.E.2d at 1300.
23. 353 Mass. 498, 233 N.E.2d 18 (1968).
24. 390 Mass. 6, 453 N.E.2d 430 (1983).
4
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third parties for injuries caused by their respective customers. 25 The duty in
those cases had been predicated partially on the fact that the harm had been
foreseeable and partially on the court's finding that the relevant statutes
indicated the legislature's concern for the safety of the general public.
2 6
The court found that special relationship with the plaintiffs in the instant
case by analogy.2 7 By reviewing the Massachusetts statutes detailing the police
officer's power with regards to intoxicated drivers2 8 and the statutes requiring
the police to act, 29 the court found that the legislature had evidenced an
intent to protect users of the highway.30 The court had earlier stated that
25. Michnik-Ziberman, 390 Mass. at 7, 453 N.E.2d at 431; Adamian, 353
Mass. at 501, 233 N.E.2d at 20.
26. Irwin, 392 Mass. at 757-58, 467 N.E.2d at 1301-02.
27. Id. at 758-59, 467 N.E.2d at 1302.
28. Id. at 759, 467 N.E.2d at 1302. The court quoted, in part as set out, the
following statutes:
Any officer authorized to make arrests ... may arrest without warrant any
person . .. who the officer has probable cause to believe has operated or
is operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 21 (West Supp. 1985).
Whoever operates a motor vehicle upon any way or in any place to which
the public has access ... shall be deemed to have consented to submit to
a chemical test or analysis of his breath or blood in the event he is arrested
for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor....
Such test shall be administered at the direction of a police officer ... having
reasonable grounds to believe that the person arrested has been operating a
motor vehicle ... while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24(l)(f) (West Supp. 1985).
Any person who is incapacitated may be assisted by a police officer with or
without his consent to his residence, to a facility or to a police station. To
determine ... whether or not such person is intoxicated, the police officer
may request to submit to reasonable tests.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. llIB, § 8 (West 1983).
29. Irwin, 392 Mass. at 759-60, 467 N.E.2d at 1302. The court cites a statute
which makes driving while intoxicated an automobile law violation. MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 90, § 24()(a)(1) (West Supp. 1985). The court finds a duty to act by citing
the statute that requires that the officer issue a record upon a citation for each
automobile law violation. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90C, § 2 (West Supp. 1985).
Further, the court quotes a statute that states that the "[Police officers of all
cities and towns].. . shall suppress and prevent all disturbances and disorder." MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 41, § 98 (West 1970).
30. Irwin, 392 Mass. at 762, 467 N.E.2d at 1304. The court predicates such
a finding of legislative intent on traffic statutes. The premise that the statutes are
promulgated to protect the public is unassailable. However, it does not necessarily
follow that such an interpretation possesses sufficient strength on which the necessary
special relationship can be based and a private cause of action allowed.
The statutes may have only been meant to give the police the power reasonably
necessary to enforce the traffic statutes pertaining to driving while intoxicated. The
fact that the police may not use their statutory powers does not mean that such a
failure gives rise to a cause of action which runs to the individual plaintiff. Rather,
5
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where the risk created by the negligence of a police officer is of immediate
and foreseeable physical injury to persons who cannot reasonably protect
themselves, then a duty of care should be found. 3' After convincing itself
that other cases and courts agreed with its conclusions32 and dismissing the
town's policy arguments, 33 the court found a duty of care owed to the plain-
tiffs.14
The court in Irwin also had to decide whether the Massachusetts Tort
Claim Act" allowed an action against public employers for the negligence
such neglect may only warrant the officer's dismissal on a charge of dereliction of
duty. See infra notes 139-41 and corresponding text.
Moreover, the court does not put any limitation on such finding of legislative
intent within statutes. It is conceivable that whenever a police officer acts unreason-
ably and an unknown plaintiff is injured, the court will be able to base the necessary
special relationship on an applicable statute within the state penal code. Compared
with the traffic statutes which were meant to protect the offender and the public, the
penal code was enacted with a much stronger, more narrow intent on the part of the
legislature to protect the public.
31. Irwin, 392 Mass. at 756, 467 N.E.2d at 1300.
32. Id. at 757-62, 467 N.E.2d at 1302-03. The court string cited cases for the
proposition that liability can arise soley from a violation of an affirmative duty to
act with reasonable care to prevent harm to another caused by a third person. The
cases cited, however, contain additional relationships either between the plaintiff and
the defendant (businessperson/customer, common carrier/passenger) or between the
person actually injuring the plaintiff and the defendant (parent/child, employer/
employee, doctor/patient).
The court also cited a string of cases for the proposition that such a duty to
prevent harm to a third person has been recognized for public employees as well.
The Florida cases of Commercial Carrier and Huhn are found within this group.
33. Irwin, 392 Mass. at 762-63, 467 N.E.2d at 1304. The town had raised the
possibility of economic hardship due to such claims. The court stated that the leg-
islature, by enacting the tort liability statute, had decided to put the public funds at
risk. The court was further persuaded in its conclusion by noting that the legislature
had limited such claims to a $100,000 maximum.
The town had also argued that the task of determining whether any driver is
intoxicated is inherently difficult. The town asserted that holding the town liable in
these situations would either cause the police to arrest whenever they suspected in-
toxication, or else cause the police to avoid stopping doubtful cases for fear of suit
by those arrested but not intoxicated.
The court stated that those arguments were at best speculative and simply not
relevant to the issue of duty. By dismissing them as such, the court seems to implicitly
accept the idea that the decision to stop and then the decision to arrest are within
the realm of police judgment and discretion. For whatever reasons, the court did not
address these policy arguments when deciding whether the police's actions were ex-
empt as a discretionary act.
34. Irwin, 392 Mass. at 764, 467 N.E.2d at 1303-04.
35. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258, § 2 (West 1978). The relevant part of the
act states:
Public employers shall be liable for injury or loss of property or personal
6
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of their officers. The act imposes liability upon governmental entities for
the negligence or wrongful acts of public employees acting within the scope
of their employment. However, the statute exempts from liability any act
based on the performance of a discretionary function or duty by a public
employee.36 Therefore, the court stated that it first had to determine whether
the police officer's actions were of a discretionary nature.17
The court in an earlier decision had described discretionary acts as "those
characterized by the high degree of discretion and judgment involved in
weighing alternatives and making choices with respect to public policy and
planning." 38 Such acts were exempt from liability. Those acts which involved
carrying out established policies and plans were not discretionary and there-
fore, not exempt. Applying this standard, the court found that no reasonable
basis existed for arguing that the police officer was making policy.39 The
police officer's job was to carry out that policy established by the legislature
through the state's statutes ° As such, if the plaintiff could prove the elements
of negligence, the Massachusetts statute would permit recovery against the
town.
Most recently, the Florida Supreme Court was faced with two directly
conflicting decisions by two of the state's district courts of appeal. The Second
District, in Everton v. Willard4 1 had dismissed such a cause of action based
injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
public employee while acting within the scope of his office or employment,
in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under
like circumstances....
36. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258, § 10 (West Supp. 1985) states, in it
relevant part:
The provisions of sections one to eight, inclusive, shall not apply to:
(b) any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a public
employer or public employee, acting within the scope of his office or em-
ployment, whether or not the discretion involved is abused;
37. Irwin, 392 Mass. at 752, 467 N.E.2d at 1298.
38. Id. at 753, 467 N.E.2d at 1298 (quotation omitted). This definition is
quite similar to the test adopted by the Florida Supreme Court in Commercial Carrier,
371 So. 2d at 1022. It is interesting to note that the Florida court based its decision
on the separation of powers doctrine while the Massachusetts court relied on the
statutorily mandated exception. Comparing the two, it seems possible that the defi-
nition, as adopted by the Massachusetts court, could be too restrictive. The adopted
language would likewise seem to be dictated by the Massachusetts separation of
powers doctrine. See MAss. CONST. Pt. 1, art. 30. This definition may have rendered
legislative language superfluous unless the legislature had intended only to acknowl-
edge the doctrine in the statute.
39. Irwin, 392 Mass at 753, 467 N.E.2d at 1299.
40. Id.
41. 426 So. 2d 996 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). The complaint in Everton alleged
7
Howard: Howard: Allowing the Drunk to Drive
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1986
608 MISSOURI LA W REVIEW [Vol. 51
upon its reading of the Florida sovereign immunity statute as interpreted by
the Florida Supreme Court in Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River
County.42 In a later decision, Huhn v. Dixie Insurance Company,4 3 the Fifth
District had allowed such a suit after rejecting the Everton reading of the
statutes and the case law. The issue in Florida revolved soley around whether
their concept of sovereign immunity would protect the governmental entities
from this type of suit.
In Huhn and Everton, both courts of appeal were called upon to apply
the Florida sovereign immunity statute" as interpreted in Commercial Car-
rier. The petitioner in Commercial Carrier had noted that the Florida statute
did not exclude discretionary acts from being the basis of liability. 45 Pointing
out that the Federal Tort Claims Act4 6 has such a provision 47 and that it had
that 10 to 20 minutes after the alleged drunken driver was stopped by a county deputy
for making an illegal U-turn, he collided with a car in which the plaintiff was a
passenger, causing serious injury. Although the deputy allegedly knew by observation,
and by the driver's admissions, that he had been drinking, the deputy allowed him
to continue. Id. at 998.
42. 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979).
43. 453 So. 2d 70 (Fla. Ct. Dist. App. 1984). The facts as pleaded stated that
Laura Huhn had been struck and severely injured by a car driven by Timmy Lynn
Collins while he was under the influence of alcohol. Shortly before the accident,
Collins had been stopped by a City of Daytona Beach police officer who observed
Collins' intoxicated state but did not detain, arrest, or otherwise prevent him from
operating his automobile. Id. at 71.
44. The Florida sovereign immunity statute is found at FLA. STAT. § 768.28
(1981) and, in its relevant part, states:
[T]he state ... hereby waives sovereign immunity for liability for torts, but
only to the extent specified in this act. Actions at law against the state or
any of its agencies or subdivisions to recover damages in tort for money
damages against the state or its agencies or subdivisions for injury or loss
of property, personal injury, or death caused by the negligent or wrongful
act or omission of any employee of the agency or subdivision while acting
within the scope of his office or employment under circumstances in which
the state or such agency or subdivision, if a private person, would be liable
to the claimant, in accordance with the general laws of this state....
45. Commercial Carrier, 371 So. 2d at 1017.
46. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1975). In its relevant part, it states: "The United States
shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstan-
ces. . ."
47. The exemption for discretionary acts is found in 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1975),
which states:
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this'title shall not apply
to-(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the
Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation,
whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise
or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function
or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government,
whether or not the discretion involved be abused....
8
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been the model for the Florida statute 4 the plaintiff argued that the Florida
legislature did not intend that discretionary acts be immune. 49 The Florida
Supreme Court, after surveying how other courts had dealt with the identical
problem,50 stated that they were convinced that "certain policy-making, plan-
ning, or judgmental government functions" 5' could not be subject to tradi-
tional tort liability.
The court's concern in holding governmental bodies liable for discre-
tionary acts went to the obstruction of normal governmental operations.1
2
The court expressed its belief that judicial incursions would necessarily bring
into question the decisions by those bodies.53 The court was worried that this
would be violative of the separation of powers doctrine. In essence, the court
was worried about judge and jury substituting their judgment for the judg-
ment of those who had the legitimate right to make such decisions.5 4 If such
liability were indeed imposed, a chilling effect on the government's decision-
making processes was foreseen due to the breaking of the pattern of con-
stitutionally and statutorily imposed separation.55
In order to exempt such functions, the court adopted the operational/
planning test56 as expressed by the California case of Johnson v. State.
7
Under that test, any decisions or acts dealing with basic policy decisions were
to be immune. 8 Decisions or acts which carry out or implement that policy
were operational and subject to tort liability. 9
The court also directed the courts to use the four question test developed
in Evangelical United Brethren Church v. State6° as a "useful tool for anal-
ysis."' 6' Those four questions are as follows:
(1) Does the challenged act, omission, or decision necessarily involve a
basic governmental policy, program, or objective? (2) Is the questioned act,
omission, or decision essential to the realization or accomplishment of that
policy, program, or objective as opposed to one which would not change
the course or direction of the policy, program, or objective? (3) Does the
48. Commercial Carrier, 371 So. 2d at 1017.
49. Id.
50. See Weiss v. Fote, 7 N.Y.2d 579, 167 N.E.2d 63, 200 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1960);
Harris v. State, 48 Ohio Misc. 27, 358 N.E.2d 639 (Ct. CI. 1976); Evangelical United
Brethren Church v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 246, 407 P.2d 440 (1965) (en banc).
51. Commercial Carrier, 371 So. 2d at 1020.
52. Id. at 1018.
53. Id. at 1019 (quotation omitted).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1020.
56. Id. at 1022.
57. 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968).
58. Commercial Carrier, 371 So. 2d at 1021.
59. Id.
60. 67 Wash. 2d 246, 407 P.2d 440 (1965).
61. Commercial Carrier, 371 So. 2d at 1022.
6091986]
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act, omission, or decision require the exercise of basic policy evaluation,
judgment, and expertise on the part of the governmental agency involved?
(4) Does the governmental agency involved possess the requisite constitu-
tional, statutory, or lawful authority and duty to do or make the challenged
act, omission, or decision?
6
In deciding Everton, the Second District Court of Appeals looked to
how the supreme court had applied the Commercial Carrier standard .6 In a
later case, the supreme court had quoted Commercial Carrier, emphasizing
that "there must be room for basic governmental policy decisions and im-
plementation thereof."6' The court of appeal then expressed the belief that
too much emphasis had been placed on one sentence of Commercial Carrier
that had declared the act in that case to be operational. 65 While admitting
that the police's actions were operational," the court believed that merely
because an activity was operational did not mean that it did not fall within
the implementation of governmental policy exception. 67 The court concluded
the supreme court had not imposed an absolute operation test in Commercial
Carrier.68
Stating that the case was a "square peg' 69 that fit neither the opera-
tional/planning nor discretionary/nondiscretionary categories, the court ap-
plied the Evangelical four-question test. Answering all four questions in the
affirmative,7 ° the court determined that the proper planning and implemen-
62. Id. at 1019 (quoting Evangelical United Brethren Church, 67 Wash. 2d at
255, 407 P.2d at 445).
63. Everton, 426 So. 2d at 1000-01 (discussing Department of Transp. v.
Neilson, 419 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 1982)).
64. Neilson, 419 So. 2d at 1075 (quotations omitted).
65. Everton, 426 So. 2d at 1001. The court was referring to the last sentence
in the following passage: "Recurring, then, to the instant cases. It is apparent that
the maintenance of a traffic signal light which is in place does not fall within that
category of governmental activity which involves broad policy or planning decisions.
This is operational level activity." Id. at 1001 (quoting Commercial Carrier, 371 So.
2d at 1022) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
66. Everton, 426 So. 2d at 1001.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1003.
69. Id.
70. Id. The court supplied the following answers to the Evangelical test:
(1) Yes, that program being a reasonable system of law enforcement. (2)
Yes, because we believe that to remove discretion from the operational level
of law enforcement would make a radical change in the ability to maintain
a reasonable, workable system of law enforcement. (3) Yes, because probably
nowhere else is evaluation, judgment, or expertise so immediately necessary
as it may affect citizens' basic rights as with the law enforcement officer in
the field. (4) Yes, again because if discretion were removed, law enforcement
would necessarily undergo radical and unknown changes.
[Vol. 51
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tation of a viable system of law enforcement must include the use of the
officer's discretion.7 1
The court found the deputy's action to be immune because it concluded
there was a basic governmental need to maintain a reasonable and adequate
system of law enforcement. 72 The court believed that in order to meet that
need the use of the officer's discretion while in the field was "essential," 73
even though a system of lav enforcement would necessarily consist of op-
erational activities. 74 The concern that a radical change would result if such
discretion was removed was expressed throughout the opinion75 and formed
the basis for answers the court gave to the Evangelical four-prong test.7 6
The Everton court next recommended a close reading of the Florida law
concerning judicial and prosecutorial immunity under the Florida act.77 The
court concluded that it would not be fair to allow judges and prosecutors,
acting deliberately "in the cool light of day, ' 78 to remain immune, while
imposing liability on the field officer under the pressures of the moment. 79
In reaching the opposite conclusion in Huhn, the Fifth District Court
of Appeal, after reviewing the history of sovereign immunity in Florida,
emphasized the operational/planning test in Commercial Carrier. The court
quoted the supreme court's conclusion that "certain policy-making, planning
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1001.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Everton, 426 So. 2d at 1002-03. The court quoted and discussed two articles
detailing the use of and the need for discretion on the part of police officers. Besides
discussing Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-
Visibility Decisions in the Adminstration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543 (1960), the
court quoted extensively from a book entitled Arrest: The Decision to Take a Suspect
Into Custody, by Professor Wayne R. LaFave. The book discusses the need to take
into account the individual circumstances of the individual offender, whose charac-
teristics complicate administration by mere application of the rules. LaFave quoted
Justice Charles D. Breitel, who has stressed that: "[ilf every policeman ... performed
his ... responsibilities in strict accordance with the rules of law, precisely and nar-
rowly laid down, the criminal law would be ordered but intolerable." W. LAFAVE,
ARREST: THE DECISION NOT TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 72 (1965) (quoting
Breitel, Controls in Criminal Enforcement, 27 U. Cm. L. REV. 427 (1960)). The LaFave
article recognized that arrest discretion was not widely accepted due to the belief that
circumstances should mitigate the punishment, not completely exonerate. Courts that
did recognize the need for an officer's discretion often did so on the grounds that
individual circumstances could make even arrest excessive. Therefore, discretion is
believed to be needed at the early stages as well as the subsequent stages. W. LAFAVE,
supra, at 69-70, 71-72.
76. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
77. Everton, 426 So. 2d at 1003; see Berry v. State, 400 So. 2d 80 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1981).
78. Everton, 426 So. 2d at 1003.
79. Id.
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or judgmental governmental functions" 0 could not be subject to tort liability.
The court, although listing the four questions that constitute the Evangelical
test,8 did not attempt to apply the test. Instead, after reviewing and rejecting
Everton and its progeny,8 2 the court read Commercial Carrier to hold that
immunity would only be a protection in cases where the political subdivision
exercises 'discretionary' governmental functions. . . ."I' The court stated
that only those functions "undertaken by the coordinate branches of gov-
ernment that impact on the free exercise of the operation of government" 84
would be afforded protection from tort liability. The court concluded that
the officer was not exercising a discretionary governmental function in al-
lowing a "visibly" intoxicated driver to continue to operate an automobile
and thus reversed the trial court.8 5
In comparing the two decisions, the Fifth District Court of Appeal seems
to be more in line with the supreme court's reasoning in Commercial Carrier.
In Huhn, the court recognizes the separation of powers argument with its
"coordinate branches" 8 6 language and the potential chilling effect with its
"free exercise"87 language. However, the Second District Court of Appeal
in Everton asked the fundamental question-how can a government maintain
a reasonable and adequate system of law enforcement if discretion is removed
from the field? Believing that the goal could not be met with such a restric-
tion, the court declined to hold the government liable on what appears to
be a sound policy argument. Thus, the stage was set for the Florida Supreme
Court.
On April 4, 1985, the Florida Supreme Court attempted to clear up the
confusion surrounding Commercial Carrier and, by doing so, to decide whether
Huhn or Everton was correct. The court, in Trianon Park Condominium
Association v. City of Hialeah,88 sought to clarify the Florida concept of
sovereign immunity.
In Trianon Park, a condominium association had sued a city for its
negligent inspection and certification of the units that its members had pur-
chased. 89 Although plaintiff prevailed, it petitioned the court for review of
80. Huhn, 453 So. 2d at 73 (quoting Commercial Carrier, 371 So. 2d at 1020).
81. Id. at 74.
82. Id. at 74-75.
83. Id. at 75.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 75-77. It is interesting to note that the court, throughout its opinion,
constantly uses such descriptive words as "visibly," "unquestionably," and "appar-
ent" to describe the alleged drunken state of the driver. Although the court is merely
echoing the adjectives alleged in the complaint, this cause of action would not seem
to be limited to just those situations.
86. Id. at 75.
87. Id.
88. 468 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1985).
89. Id. at 915.
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a question that had been certified by the district court of appeal.9 The Florida
Supreme Court reversed, 9' stating that there was no common law duty that
ran to citizens for the enforcement of "police power functions" and that to
allow liability in these situations was a result never intended by the legislature
or the city.92 The court also expressed a concern that the government would
be acting as an insuror.93 In reaching its decision, the Florida Supreme Court
appeared to overrule Commercial Carrier sub silentio despite protestations
to the contrary.
In its opinion, the court first set out what it considered the basic prin-
ciples in this field. Among those are the principles that legislative enactments
do not automatically create duties of care to either individuals or specific
classes94 and that no duty exists to enforce the law for the benefit of an
individual or specified group.9s The court also reaffirmed the concepts upon
which Commercial Carrier was based-that the constitutional separation of
powers doctrine forbids certain suits which would allow the judiciary to
substitute its judgment for the judgment of those in the legislative or executive
branches and that certain discretionary functions, by their very nature, are
inherent in the act of governing and are immune.9 6
Most significantly, the court read the sovereign immunity statute to mean
that only the existing duties of private individuals would now apply to gov-
ernmental entities97 unless there exists a statutory duty. However, this idea
had been argued to the court in Commercial Carrier and rejected. 98 Further,
this argument has been widely rejected and discredited in many states as well
as the federal system. 99
90. Id. The question certified was
[W]hether under section 768.28, Florida Statutes (1975), as construed in
Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla.
1979), a municipality retains its sovereign immunity from a suit predicating
liability solely upon the allegedly negligent inspection of a building, where
that municipality played no part in the actual construction of the building.
Id. at 914.
The supreme court restated the question, foreshadowing the eventual outcome,
as
[w]hether a governmental entity may be liable in tort to individual property
owners for the negligent actions of its building inspectors in enforcing pro-




92. Id. at 915.
93. Id. In his dissent, Justice Ehrlich stated that this is simply not true because
fault must still be proven. Id. at 925.
94. Id. at 917.
95. Id. at 918.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 917.
98. Commercial Carrier, 371 So. 2d at 1016-17.
99. See, e.g., Indiana Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
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In order to further clarify the Florida concept of sovereign immunity,
the court then categorized government functions and activities into four cat-
egories. The court looked at each cateory to decide whether liability could
arise.
The first category the court delineated was labeled legislative, permitting,
licensing, and executive officer functions.'0° This category was based squarely
on the separation of powers concept and thus is wholly consistent with the
ideas behind the planning exemption found within Commercial Carrier. Ab-
sent the violation of a constitutional or statutory provision, there seems to
be little doubt that the judicial branch cannot hear certain cases which call
into question the basic decisions of its sister branches.
The second category is the enforcement of laws and the protection of
public safety.'0' The court stated that enforcing compliance with laws is a
discretionary power within the act of governing and that no common law
duty of care existed. 0 2 The court stated that such power was reflected in
judges, prosecutors, arresting officers, law enforcement agencies, and in-
spectors of all types. 03 The court believed that such a "discretionary function
exception" was recognized in the Federal Tort Claims Act and had been
recognized as inherent by many states.' °4 The court did, however, allow that
actions based upon motor vehicle operations and handling of firearms were
maintainable. 05
The court said that its third category, functions, capital improvements,
and property control,'06 could give rise to liability in some instances. Although
the court reaffirmed that the decision to build, modernize, or expand was a
discretionary decision and therefore immune, 0 7 the court did recognize that
maintenance and control issues could give rise to liability just "as a private
person" would be liable.1"1
The last, catch-all category, providing professional, educational, and
general services,' °9 can also give rise to liability. They "are performed by
private persons as well as governmental entities" and therefore common law
duties do exist." 0 It is to the third and fourth categories that the court directed
the Evangelical test be applied."'




104. Id. at 919-20.
105. Id. at 920. This exception again points to the acceptance of the argument
that the statute only addressed duties common with the general public. See supra
notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
106. Trianon Park, 468 So. 2d at 920.
107. Id.
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Given its categories in Trianon Part, Everton and Huhn were easy cases
for the court. Everton was affirmed in less than three pages; ' 2 Huhn was
reversed in a paragraph.' 11
As might be expected, the dissents in all three cases were consistent and
severe. Charges of retrenching the governmental/proprietary distinction,'
4
embracing the dissent in Commercial Carrier,"5 and that this was a return
to the statutorily overruled public duty doctrine' 6 as expressed in Modlin
were leveled by Justice Ehrlich in his Trianon Park dissent." 7 In his Everton
dissent, Justice Ehrlich agreed fully with the Huhn decision.'
1 8
However, it is within the dissents of Justice Shaw that the correct ap-
proaches to the issues are outlined. His dissent in Trianon Park pointed out
that the majority is continually confusing the question of duty with the
question of sovereign immunity.' 9 Such being the case, he limited himself
to the question of duty in his Trianon Park dissent. He agreed with Justice
Ehrlich and the public duty doctrine as expressed in Modlin.'20 Nonetheless,
Justice Shaw thought that if Modlin was again viable, a special duty existed
in this instance due to the government's and the police officer's actions.' 2'
Regardless of the approach used, Justice Shaw concluded that the city had
a duty to use reasonable care with respect to the plaintiff.
Within his Everton dissent, Justice Shaw addresses the question of sov-
ereign immunity. After discussing two errors of the district court of appeal,
22
Justice Shaw argued his belief that "government entities are not sovereignly
immune from suit on discretionary, planning, or police power activities.' ' 23
111. Id.
112. Everton v. Willard, 468 So. 2d 936 (Fla. 1985). The body of the opinion
spans pages 937-39.
113. City of Daytona Beach v. Huhn, 468 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1985). The court,
relying on Everton II, reversed and remanded in two sentences.
114. Trianon Park, 468 So. 2d at 924.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 926.
117. Id. at 923-26.
118. Everton, 468 So. 2d at 940.
119. Trianon Park, 468 So. 2d at 926.
120. Id. at 927-28.
121. Id. at 928.
122. Everton, 468 So. 2d at 940. The first error dealt with the district court of
appeal's dismissal of the action against the police officer due to § 768.28(a)(9) of the
Florida Statutes. That statute protects officers from liability absent some form of
intent or bad faith. Justice Shaw pointed out that the statute had been passed after
the incident now in question and that retroactive effect had been denied the statute
in Rupp v. Bryant, 417 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1982).
The second error concerned the practice of treating all allegations found within
a petition as being true for purposes of a motion challenging its statement of a cause
of action. Justice Shaw did not believe the court had done so.
123. Trianon Park, 468 So. 2d at 926.
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He first explained his belief that the majority had expanded sovereign im-
munity protection beyond its pre-statute scope with its "police power" lan-
guage and thus had the effect of overruling the statute.' 24 He next outlined
exactly what Commercial Carrier had decided. He pointed out that the court
in that case had rejected the governmental/proprietary distinction and the
general/special duty argument. 12S Quoting from Commercial Carrier, he
showed that the Johnson planning/operational exemption to the waiver had
been predicated on the concern over the possible violation of constitution-
ally mandated separation of powers. 26 In Shaw's view, this was the court's
"only defensible ground in Florida for creating a discretionary exception' ' 2 7
as it was not within the court's "authority to override the constitutional and
statutory provisions authorizing access to the courts"'' 28 and that it was not
the court's function to safeguard the public purse.' 29
Having said this, Shaw went back to the basics to try to clear the
confusion. Among other Florida constitutional provisions, he set out Article
X, section 13 which states that "[p]rovision may be made by general law for
bringing suit against the state as to all liabilities now existing or hereafter
originating." '30
He also quoted Article II, section 3 which provides: "The powers of the
state government shall be divided into legislative, executive, and judicial
branches. No person belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers ap-
pertaining to either of the other branches unless expressly provided herein."' 3 '
Relying on those two provisions along with others set out in his dissent, 132
Justice Shaw read them as a mandate to hear tort cases against the state.' 3
He reasoned that by enacting the sovereign immunity statute, the Florida
legislature had exercised its powers under Article X, section 13 and thus the
courts, which are the exclusive holders of the judicial power, must hear the
124. Everton, 468 So. 2d at 942-43.
125. Id. at 943.
126. Id. at 944 (quotations omitted).
127. Id. at 946.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. (quoting FLA. CoNsT. art. X, § 13).
131. Id. (quoting FLA. CoNsr. art. II, § 3) (emphasis added by Shaw, J.,
dissenting).
132. Justice Shaw also set out article V, section 1, which provides: "The
judicial power shall be vested in a supreme court, district courts of appeal, circuit
courts and county courts. No other courts may be established by the state, any political
subdivision, or any municipality . . . ." FLA. CONST. art. V, § 1.
Article I, section 21 was also quoted. It states that "[t]he courts shall be open
to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administrated without
sale, denial, or delay." FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21.
133. Everton, 468 So. 2d at 946.
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case. 34 He further argued that even if the separation of powers argument is
valid, 35 the Article II, section 3 exception emphasized above has been met
by the Article X, section 13 allowance for "suits against the state."' 36 He
concluded that the Commercial Carrier exception can only be applied to
"non-justiciable political questions."' 37
Justice Shaw appears to want to decide questions of tort liability as if
the suit had been brought against an individual. He rejected the planning/
operational distinction, stating that as long as a tort can be proven, it should
not matter whether it was the result of a "plan."' ' 3 While one may be hard
pressed to find at present an example of a situation in which the legislative
or executive branch has "planned" or will "plan" a tort, the fact that the
majority of questions arising in tort are for a jury leaves too much room
for second guessing the government's branches. For example, the question
of what is reasonable in a negligence suit would be extremely troublesome.
The jury would be, in effect, playing legislature or executive when it deter-
mines how they should have acted in deciding a factual issue. The separation
of powers doctrine acts as a constitutional barrier to such litigation and is
not subject to the dangers caused by a sympathetic plaintiff.
Given that the separation of powers doctrine still has a place in deter-
mining sovereign immunity, Justice Shaw's assertion that in such a case the
exception of Article II, section 3 applies is incorrect. He has bootstrapped
to reach that exception. The above-emphasized exception, "unless expressly
provided herein," would seem to apply only to the exceptions found within
the constitution itself, not statutes passed by the legislature at a later date.
If one accepts his reading of the Florida Constitution, the legislature and
the governor could then control the extent to which separation of powers
will be followed in Florida. Using Shaw's view, laws could be passed allowing
suits against any of the three branches on any of their decisions, no matter
how fundamental. After such passage, nothing encompassed in the statute
would be a non-justiciable political question as that doctrine, grounded in
the separation of powers doctrine, has been modified via that exception.
Further, such a reading would have the effect of bypassing the amendment
mechanism found in the Florida Constitution. His reliance on Article I,
section 21 is also not well founded. Although the section seemingly allows
for any suit, in practice it does not have that effect. Access to courts is
always controlled by statutes of limitations, procedural requirements, and
other devices. It would appear that Justice Shaw has read the constitution
too broadly.
134. Id. It is here Justice Shaw cites article I, section 21. See supra note 131.
135. Everton, 468 So. 2d at 946.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Trianon Park, 468 So. 2d at 928 n.4. (Shaw, J., dissenting).
19861
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The best way to approach this problem would have been to point to
Article X, section 13 and the legislature's use of this exclusive power as
found in section 768.28(1) of the Florida Statutes. Then relying on Article
II, section 3, the supreme court should have carved out an exception based
on the mandated separation of powers doctrine since the exception of that
section had not been met. In essence, the supreme court should have reaf-
firmed Commercial Carrier and underscored the reasoning behind it. Then,
much like the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts declared in Irwin,
the court could have stated that such a suit did not bring into question the
separation of powers doctrine as no reasonable grounds existed for arguing
that the police officer was making policy. The suit could have then been
remanded for a decision on the merits.
It is the height of irony that the separation of powers doctrine, the
original basis for Commercial Carrier, is now being violated by the Florida
Supreme Court in deciding which governmental decisions can give rise to
liability. That good public policies surround the majority's decision in Tri-
anon, Everton II, and Huhn II cannot be doubted. However, without an
exemption such as found in the Federal Tort Claims Act, those arguments
should be irrelevant to a court. The floor of the legislature is the place to
make such arguments, not the courtroom.
The availability of such a cause of action in Missouri will depend, of
course, upon the plaintiff establishing actionable negligence. As defined in
Missouri, a plaintiff must prove three elements: (1) there must be a duty on
the part of the defendant to protect plaintiff from the injury of which he
complains; (2) the defendant must fail to perform that duty; and (3) the
injury must proximately result from such failure.3 9 In proving and recovering
for negligence in this type of situation, the plaintiff would face two sub-
stantial barriers-proving a sufficient duty and avoiding the defense of sov-
ereign immunity.
The Missouri Supreme Court in Parker v. Sherman'40 adopted the public
duty doctrine. In Parker, a sheriff was sued by a taxpayer for failing to
prohibit the operation of games of chance to the detriment of the commu-
nity's morals and the plaintiff's investments.' 4' The court stated:
Sheriffs should and must enforce the criminal laws of this State. If they fail
to do so they can be removed from office .... However, this Court cannot
recognize a civil cause of action to cover a sheriff's failure ... when [the
statute] does not so provide ... chaos would result.142
Recently, in Berger v. City of University City, 43 the present viability of
the public duty doctrine was tested. The Bergers had alleged that University
139. Dix v. Motor Mkt., 540 S.W.2d 927, 932 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
140. 456 S.W.2d 577 (Mo. 1970).
141. Id. at 578.
142. Id. at 580.
143. 676 S.W.2d 39 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
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City firefighters, who were striking illegally, had prevented firefighters from
surrounding municipalities from dousing a fire on their property. The plain-
tiffs were suing numerous city officials and the municipality for failing to
enforce city ordinances and to provide police protection even though it was
specifically requested.' 44The trial court had based its dismissal of the petition
on the public duty doctrine. 41
The Eastern District Court of Appeals stated that in Missouri public
officers are not liable to particular individuals for injuries resulting from
breach by the officers of a duty owed to the general public. 46 Such duties,
the court stated, are not present between the particular individual and the
public officer. 47 The court did take notice that some jurisdictions have adopted
a special duty exception when there exist certain characteristics between the
police and the individual. 48 However, the court recognized that such an
exception had not been adopted in Missouri,' 49 and therefore affirmed the
trial court's decision as to the public officials and the municipality.10 Ap-
plying this analysis to the situation at question here, it would appear that
the plaintiff would be unable to prove a duty.
However, should a court find an enforceable duty, it would then have
to apply the Missouri concept of sovereign immunity. In Missouri the com-
mon law doctrine of sovereign immunity still exists in large part. The basic
rule remains that the state, its agencies, and subdivisions cannot be sued for
negligence.' 5 ' The Missouri legislature has, however, abrogated the doctrine
to some extent.
5 2
144. Id. at 40-41.
145. Id. at 41.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. The court listed four elements needed for proving such a special duty:
(1) the municipality is uniquely aware of the particular danger or risk to
which the plaintiff is exposed; (2) there are allegations of specific acts or
omissions on the part of the municipality; (3) the acts or omissions are either
affirmative or willful in nature; and (4) the injury occurs while plaintiff is




150. Id. at 42.
151. O'Dell v. School Dist. of Independence, 521 S.W.2d 403 (Mo. 1975) (en
banc).
152. The Missouri legislature has codified the common law in Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 537.600 (1978), which states, in part:
Such sovereign or governmental tort immunity as existed at common law in
this state prior to September 12, 1977, except to the extent waived, abrogated
or modified by statutes in effect prior to that date, shall remain in full force
and effect; except that, the immunity of the public entity from liability and
suit for compensatory damages for negligent acts or omissions is hereby
1986]
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Only one such exception to the general rule would be applicable in such
cases. The legislature has enacted a statute which provides:
[S]overeign immunity for the state of Missouri and its political subdivisions
is waived only to the maximum amount of and only for the purposes covered
by such policy of insurance purchased pursuant to the provisions of this
section and in such amount and for such purposes provided in any self-
insurance plan duly adopted by the governing body of any political subdi-
vision of the state.1
53
Such insurance is not mandatory. 5 4 Therefore, not only must the state
or its subdivision have procurred insurance, the plaintiff's claim must be
covered by the policy. Further, even if it is covered, the legislature has set
limits as to what can be recovered-$100,000 for any one person in a single
occurrence, and $800,000 for all claims arising out of a single occurrence . 55
Thus, given Missouri common law and its statutes concerning sovereign im-
munity, this type of cause of action would be severely limited if brought
against the state or its subdivisions.
If the injured party sued a municipal corporation, the court would have
to apply a different rule. Missouri still adheres to the governmental/pro-
prietary distinction when deciding whether the defense of sovereign immunity
affords protection to a municipal corporation. 56 The court decides if the
function that gave rise to the claim was a governmental function or a pro-
prietary one by looking at the character of the act performed. 57 A govern-
mental function has been defined as a function that is performed for the
good of all.' 58 If the act is a governmental function, then no liability will
expressly waived in the following instances: (1) Injuries directly resulting
from the negligent acts or omissions by public employees arising out of
operation of motor vehicles or motorized vehicles within the course of their
employment; (2) Injuries caused by the condition of a public entity's property
if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at
the time of the injury, that the injury directly resulted from the dangerous
condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk
of harm of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that either a negligent
or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the
course of his employment created the dangerous condition or a public entity
had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition in sufficient
time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dan-
gerous condition.
153. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.610.1 (1978).
154. Id. "[T]he governing body of each political subdivision ... may purchase
liability insurance . . . ." Id. (emphasis added).
155. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.610.2 (1978).
156. Davis v. City of St. Louis, 612 S.W.2d 812 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
157. Jones v. State Highway Comm'n, 557 S.W.2d 225, 229 (Mo. 1977) (en
banc).
158. Davis, 612 S.W.2d at 814.
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attach from any injury that might have resulted. 59 However, if the act is a
proprietary act, then the municipal corporation can be held liable.' 6 A pro-
prietary function is one that is performed for the profit or special benefit of
the municipal corporation.16'
In Missouri, it appears clear that the operation and maintenance of a
police force is a governmental function. 62 However, the legislature has again
provided for some limited relief in these situations. Section 71.185 of the
Missouri Revised Statutes provides that a municipality may carry liability
insurance to cover such governmental functions and may be held liable to
the extent of the insurance provisions. 61
Thus, it would appear that this type of cause of action against any
political division in Missouri will be difficult, if not impossible, to bring and
limited in recovery without some redefining and overruling by the judiciary
and some legislative amending.
Although a new and relatively narrow new cause of action, this type of
action does represent a new and difficult incursion into the area of govern-
mental tort liability. Presenting issues that depend on each state's law, many
different responses to such suits are likely to be seen. Those states where
common law sovereign immunity still exists are likely to dismiss them easily.
Those courts faced with a statute waiving immunity but without a discre-
tionary exception must be careful not to legislate. Those courts in states
which have waived the old immunities yet exempt discretionary actions will
have the most difficult job. Such courts will be able to dismiss the petition
due to a lack of duty. However, such a dismissal may be inconsistent with
the legislature's intent when it enacted the statute. Further complicating the
court's decision is the presence of the exception. The court will have to decide
if the exemption means something more than a codification of the separation
of powers doctrine. If it does, the court must decide if policy officers' field
decisions are of a sufficently discretionary nature as to be immune from
liability. Without a doubt, the policies argued by the town in Irwin and




162. Carmelo v. Miller, 569 S.W.2d 365, 368 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
163. Mo. REv. STAT. § 71.185 (1978) provides:
Any municipality engaged in the exercise of governmental functions may
carry liability insurance . . . to insure such municipality and their employees
against claims or causes of action for property damages or personal injuries,
including death, caused while in the exercise of the governmental functions,
and shall be liable as in other cases of torts for property damage and personal
injuries including death suffered by third persons while the municipality is
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Other questions will arise if liability is imposed. Should a police officer
be treated as a professional, subject to a professional's standard of care? If
so and the legislature does not protect the officer from personal liability,
what does this portend for the future of policeman malpractice insurance
and its costs to a historically poorly paid occupation especially in light of
today's current government insurance availability crisis? Further, if it can be
asked whether a reasonable police officer would have released a driver, can
it now be asked whether a reasonable police officer would have stopped that
car or taken heed of that tip? Where will the line be drawn?
This new cause of action raises all these questions and more. Although
the courts have yet to address most of them, the answers already given have
been conflicting. With this new door open, it will be interesting to see how
far courts will be willing to hold governmental bodies liable for the injuries
of third parties which police could, but did not, prevent.
DARRYL W. HowARD
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